The Four Eponyms of Sunni Islamic

The Polemic of Ijtihȃd versus Taqlȋd
KASIM RANDEREE
The Four Eponyms of Sunni Islamic
Jurisprudence: An Examination of the Historical
Development of the Dominant Madhȃhib and the
Polemic of Ijtihȃd versus Taqlȋd

Abstract: The framing of Islamic law in the first four centuries of Islam is of great significance to scholars. During this period, the Islamic diaspora was in the earliest part of its development, establishing its identity and developing the foundations of its knowledge principles. These times were tumultuous; yet, at the same time, what occurred during these early centuries formed the bedrock upon which a further millennium of growth has taken place in this global religion.

Many forces were interplaying during these early years in the context of Islamic law. “Independents,” who formed a majority of Islamic theorists, gradually disappeared and gave way to “Muqallidȋn” and there was discourse and allegiance amongst “Rationalists” and “Traditionalists.” There was a shift away from early regional schools (of thought) to personal schools and tremendous debate raged about Ijtihȃd and Taqlȋd. In more recent times, over the past century, orientalist commentators on the period, who have painted a picture of these early centuries of the Islamic legal system and jurisprudence as being somewhat cut and dry, have begun to be challenged. Such for example, who wrote in the early to mid-twentieth century, later had his views nuanced by scholars such as Hallaq and others. This paper thus examines the early formation of the four schools of Islamic law, recounts brief biographical accounts of their founders, and discusses the challenges faced during those early years of Islamic legal history, which are a source of disagreement among contemporary scholars.

In essence, the foundation phase relates to the era of the prophetic mission of the Prophet Muhammad (609-632 CE), dominated by Qur’ȃnic revelation (Randeree, 2010) and prophetic Ḥadȋth providing legislation and rulings to the followers of the early Muslim population.

The second phase, establishment, deals with the period of the four Sunni Caliphs, namely,

Abȗ Bakr as-Șiddīq (Abdullah ibn Uthmȃn Abi Quhafȃ), Umar ibn Al-Khattȃb, Uthmȃn ibn

‘Affȃn and Ali ibn Abi Țȃlib. This period extended from the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE until the assassination of Ali in 661 CE.

The principles of deductive reasoning, or Ijtihȃd, were laid down in this time, in part out of the necessity to cope with the rapid and vast expansion of Muslim territories which brought with it new challenges requiring legal rulings distinctive from earlier times. Islamic jurisprudence and law thus remained linked to the state legislation governed by the Caliph and thus prevented the emergence of a plurality in Madhȃhib during this phase.

The third phase, building, covers the period of the Umayyad dynasty from 661 CE until the

middle of the eighth century. This was a period of tremendous upheaval and change, a shift from the centrality of the unifying Caliphs gradually to kingships, the dispersal of scholars across vast.

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territories and countless cultures, the emergence of sects such as Shi’i and the Khawȃrij, the fabrication of Ḥadȋth in support of sectarian views and the division of scholars along the lines of rationalist (Așḥȃb al-Ra’y) and traditionalist (Așḥȃb al-Ḥadȋth). The emergence of the early schools of law occurred during this time, though the emphasis appeared to be on geographic schools rather than personal schools in this phase. Most prominently, Abȗ Ḥanȋfah2 and Sufyȃn al-Thawri were active in Kufah, Mȃlik ibn Anas3 in Medina, al-Awzȃ’y in Beirut and al-Layth ibn Șa’d in Egypt.

The final formative stage, flowering, covered the Abbȃsid dynasty and occurred from the

middle of the eighth century and extended until around 950 CE. During this period,

jurisprudence took on a formative shape, the four Madhȃhib became firmly rooted, Islamic jurisprudence became well-defined into Ușȗl and Furu’, the sources of Islamic law established a definitive hierarchy, centres of learning became more established and recognised, particularly in Iraq and Medina, compilations well-known by contemporary scholars were written, including the texts by the founders of the Madhȃhib and books of Ḥadȋth were completed in their entirety, including the six Mashhur books of Ḥadȋth.4 Towards the latter part of this phase, however, the established Madhȃhib witnessed the emergence of rigidity amongst the scholars and Taqlȋd amongst their followers.

The Dominant Madhȃhib

The four schools of Islamic jurisprudence that became dominant display a number of nuances reflecting differences of opinion amongst their four eponyms. This is significant given the fact that, at some level or another, the founders were known to each other and in some cases, students or teachers of one another. “If one closely examines the Fiqh of the four schools, one will never come across any difference of opinions as far as the basic principles of Islam are concerned. The differences mainly centre around Furu’ȃt (tiny branches) of theology rather than the Ușȗl (the fundamental principles) of belief.”

This view is supported by Bilal Philips (1990) who demonstrated that all the eponyms had

the Qur’ȃn and the Prophet’s authority in common as their primary sources of Islamic law.

Islamic law and the Prophetic injunction in relation to it are of further interest when discussing areas of contention and commonality amongst the eponyms. Jackson (1993) expounds that al- Shȃfi’ȋ5, in his book al-Risȃla, elaborates about the issue of the Prophetic legislation being Abȗ Ḥanȋfah.

Imam Abu Hanifah

Abȗ Ḥanȋfah (Nucman bin Thâbit, 703-767 CE), born in Kufah, Iraq, regarded amongst the Tabi’ȗn due to his receiving knowledge from several of the companions of Muhammad, including Anas ibn Mȃlik (Abȗ Zahra, 2001), is best known for belonging to Așḥȃb al-Ra’y, basing his teaching method on that of group discourse, or Shuru’, and the concept of Istiḥsȃn (precedence of situation) and ‘Urf (local customs). His students most famously include Abȗ Yȗsuf, who was appointed chief judge by Hȃrȗn al-Rashȋd amongst others, and Muhammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybȃnȋ, also chief judge under the same ruler as well as a student of both Abȗ Ḥanȋfah and later Mȃlik ibn Anas in Medina. Abȗ Ḥanȋfah’s refusal to take up the post of chief judge when offered by Caliph Mansûr is reported to have angered the latter to such an extent that he had Abȗ Ḥanȋfah imprisoned and later poisoned, leading to the eventual demise of Abȗ Ḥanȋfah.

Imam Mȃlik ibn Anas

Mȃlik was born in Medina in 717 CE, where he remained for almost the entirety of his life until his death within the city at the age of 83, in 801 CE. He and his followers are commonly known as Așḥȃb al-Ḥadȋth, due to his strict avoidance of speculative theology or hypothetical Fiqh, as was well-known amongst the Ḥanafȋs. His sources of Islamic law included the practices of the people of Medina as well as Istișlȃḥ, and his major and famous work, al-Muwaṭṭa’, remains a central document in Mȃlikȋ jurisprudence. Even though the political capital of the Muslim empire had already relocated to Damascus, Medina remained important to Muslims due to its strong ties to the Prophet Muhammad, and thus it thrived as a centre of spiritual enlightenment, education and learning during and beyond the lifetime of Mȃlik.

Most authentic Ḥadȋth scriptures (Sahih al-Bukhȃrȋ, Sahih Muslim, Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, Al-Nisa’i, Ibn Majah).

Imam Al Shafie

Muhammad ibn Idrȋs al-Shȃfi’ȋ

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binding, even on matters about which the Qur’ȃn did not comment; an example of the view held by all the Madhȃhib consistently. However, when the Prophet’s activities or more specifically, those that have a bearing on the derivation of Islamic law are analysed, nuances begin to emerge. To clarify the point, examine the roles of the Prophet Muhammad as Messenger, Muftȋ, Judge (Qȃdi) and Head of State (Imȃm) (Randeree, 2009). These four roles all have a direct relevance to derivation of law, namely and respectively, verbatim communications from Allȃh (messenger role); issuance of fatwa (Muftȋ role); judicial rulings (role as Qȃdi); and discretionary rulings (the right of veto as Head of State). In terms of the Madhȃhib, the view of Mȃlik and al-Shȃfi’ȋ in this context was that the majority of the Prophet’s actions constituted Fatwa in his role as Muftȋ, whereas the view of Abȗ Ḥanȋfah was that his (the Prophet Muhammad’s) actions were decrees in his role as the Head of State. This difference appears immaterial, but upon closer examination, the resultant effect can yield very divergent outcomes in terms of the ruling that is passed (Jackson, 1993). The eponyms differed on aspects such as Ijtihȃd, Qiyȃs, ‘Urf and so on, but, even these differences seem largely based on emphasis rather than substance, though an extensive number of published works have deconstructed the differentiations over the past century. Melchert (2001) outlines the most important transformations of mainstream jurisprudence in the first three centuries of Islam. At the outset, rational speculation was overshadowed by the use of textual sources, namely, the Qur’ȃn and Ḥadȋth. 

Furthermore, Ḥadȋth reports from the Prophet took precedence over reports from Companions and the later authorities particularly within Sunni Islam, with Shi’i jurisprudence relying more evidently on reports from Imȃms. The reliance on Ḥadȋth texts quickly brought into light the issue of chains of narration (Isnad) and the personal qualities of Ḥadȋth transmitters (Rijȃl). Thus, information was filtered based on the reliability of transmitters as well as their frequency of narration, and other tools at the disposal of scholars for the discernment of Ḥadȋth.

The next stage was highly significant given the context of this paper, that is, personal

schools, such as the four schools of Islamic law, winning superiority over regional schools, such as the Kufan or Medinese schools. Thus jurisprudents were no longer identified as being from a geographical region or centre of learning, but rather by their allegiance to a founder or teacher of Islamic law. Hallaq (2001) expounds this topic to claim that, in fact, neither did geographic schools exist, nor did they transform to personal schools, but rather, the transformation was “from individual juristic doctrines to doctrinal schools.” This, again, is a challenge to Schacht’s work, whose major argument on the subject, in his book, An Introduction to Islamic Law, was that legal scholarship came together around geographical centres. Schacht, as cited by Hallaq

(2001: p. 2) says,

“The bulk of the ancient school of Kufa transformed itself into the school of the Ḥanafȋs, and the ancient school of Medina into the school of the Mȃlikȋs, and the ancient schools of Basra and of Mecca, respectively, became merged into them... This transformation of the ancient schools into personal schools ... was completed about the middle of the third century of the Hijra.”
Al-Shȃfi’ȋ was the best travelled of the four eponyms in his lifetime, a fact that has moulded and impacted the formation as well as the followers of his Madhhab. Al-Shȃfi’ȋ, was from Quraish, and a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. He was born in 769 CE on the Mediterranean coast, he moved to Medina in his early life to study under Mȃlik, whose text, al-Muwaṭṭa’, Al-Shȃfi’ȋ memorised (Al-Baghdâdi, 1931, p. 59). After the death of the latter in 801 CE, he taught in Yemen for four years, was taken as a prisoner to Iraq (accused of Shi’i views), where he proved his
innocence to Hȃrȗn al-Rashȋd. He therefore remained in Iraq, where he studied under the Ḥanifȋ scholar, Muhammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybȃnȋ, before travelling to Egypt to study the Madhhab of al-Layth ibn Sa’d. He remained in Egypt until his death in 820 CE.
As a consequence of his travel and related studies, he effectively combined Ḥanafȋ and Mȃlikȋ jurisprudence. His three works, al-Hujjah, written in Iraq, articulating his early view, has become referred to as Madhhab al-Qadîm. His later work, al-Umm, written in Egypt and known as Madhhab al-Jadȋd, was, in contrast, the formation of his thoughts after absorbing the Madhhab of al-Layth, in which he reversed many of his earlier opinions. His most famous work, al-Risȃla, is well regarded, and is central to the establishment of Ușȗl al-Fiqh. His sources of Islamic law rejected both Istiḥsȃn and Istișlȃḥ, in favour of Istișḥȃb.

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This was followed by the establishment of core texts, which formed the foundation of literary knowledge for a few personal schools. Examples would include al-Muwaṭṭa’ of Mȃlik, al-Risȃla of al-Shȃfi’ȋ and the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.6 With this, the stage was set for Ḥadȋth studies and scholarship in jurisprudence becoming independent and distinct specialisations, with Muḥaddithȋn and Fuqahȃ’ becoming established prior to the development of Ușȗl al-Fiqh, as well as guild schools (which certified jurisprudents) appearing in the fifth and sixth centuries of Islam.

Another aspect to the founders of the four schools of thought is the pivotal role they played in the development of Islamic thought and jurisprudence. Al-Shȃfi’ȋ, for example, has long been credited with being the ‘Master Architect’ of Islamic jurisprudence. Contemporary scholars, however, are challenging this notion of prominence. Hallaq (1993), in his paper, “Was Al- Shȃfi’ȋ the Master Architect of Islamic Jurisprudence?” states that the leader of this view, in recent years, was Joseph Schacht, the author of “The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence” published in 1975. Hallaq says,

“Such's portentous findings, coupled with the high esteem in which Shȃfi’ȋ is held in medieval and modern Islam, have led Islamicists to believe that Shȃfi’ȋ was the “father of Muslim jurisprudence” and the founder of the science of legal theory, properly called Ușȗl al-Fiqh.” (p.587)

He continues, “Shȃfi’ȋ’s synthesis was, and remained for a long time, a minority view. The traditionalists rejected his Qiyȃs, and the rationalists were reluctant to accept his thesis that revelation is the first and last judge of human affairs. It was only towards the end of the ninth century that the two camps drew closer to each other, and a synthesis of traditionalism and rationalism was accomplished.”

Independents to Eponyms

It is of value to understand, in the context of prominence and strict adherence to Sunni Madhȃhib, how these Madhȃhib were followed in the early centuries during their formation. One measure is to have an appreciation for Muslim jurists (Fuqahȃ’) during that period, as this provides insights as to the extent of followership commanded by the eponyms of the four main Madhȃhib. In their paper about the geographical distribution of 406 Fuqahȃ’ in the first four centuries of Islam, Bernards and Nawas (2003) found that 13% were Ḥanafȋs, 29% were Mȃlikȋs, 13% were Shȃfi’ȋs, 14% were Ḥanbalȋs, 5% were Switchers and 27% were Independents. Switchers are defined as Fuqahȃ’ who, during the course of their lives, switched from adherence to one Madhhab to adherence to another. Independents were those Fuqahȃ’ who did not adhere to any Madhhab. There sample size was based on biographical accounts collected for the Ulama Project, which was completed in 2000. The database thus consisted of 1,049 biographical accounts of Islamic scholars of the early centuries of Islam, within the five main disciplines of Islamic sciences. The 406 Fuqahȃ’ cited by Bernards and Nawas (2003) were those specialised.

Imam Ahmad bin Hambal

Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal al- Shaybȃnȋ
Born in 778 CE in Baghdad, Ibn Ḥanbal studied, in his formative years, under Abȗ Yȗsuf (the famous Ḥanȋfȋ) and Al- Shȃfi’ȋ. Although he was persecuted and imprisoned at various points in his lifetime for some of his views, as were all his predecessor eponyms, Ibn Ḥanbal remained in Baghdad and taught until his death there in 855 CE. His extensive work, al-Musnad, which contains over 30,000 Ḥadȋth, remains a central manuscript underpinning the works of many of his followers, including Ibn Taymȋyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim. He is also reported to have taught both Bukhȃrȋ and Muslim, the authors of the two Șaḥȋḥs. In terms of his sources of Islamic law, he differed from the others by including weak Ḥadȋth in preference to Qiyȃs in his judgement and rulings, in circumstances where transmitters are known not to have been either degenerate (Fȃsiq) or liars (Kadhdhȃb). Today, the basis of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s legal system is based primarily on Ibn Ḥanbal’s Madhhab.

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in Islamic law, thus establishing their relevance to the study of the background of the four

schools of Islamic law. Consequently, Bernards and Nawas (2003) found that, “For the entire 400-year period studied, the Mȃlikȋ Madhhab was the largest, followed by the “Independents”, those Fuqahȃ’ who were not claimed by any of the four Sunni Madhahib. The share of the other three Sunni Madhahib, the Ḥanafȋs, the Shȃfi’ȋs and the Ḥanbalȋs, was more or less equal. The phenomenon of switching from one Sunni Madhhab to another was marginal.”

Furthermore, the last eponym (Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal) died in 241 AH; thus to focus examination on the first two and a half centuries, is of greater value. This, Bernards and Nawas (2003) reveal, demonstrates that 13% were Ḥanafȋs, 18% were Mȃlikȋs, 2% were Shȃfi’ȋs, 9% were Ḥanbalȋs, 5% were Switchers and 54% were Independents. In contrast, the following 150 years beyond the demise of the last eponym show that the figures changed dramatically, with 13% being Ḥanafȋs, 37% being Mȃlikȋs, 21% being Shȃfi’ȋs, 17% being Ḥanbalȋs, 5% being Switchers and 7% being Independents. Thus, as would be expected, proportionately most Independents disappeared in the duration of the first four centuries, with their proportions declining from 54% (0 - 250 AH) to 7% (250 - 400 AH). Consequently, large proportions of Fuqahȃ’, in the most part, migrated from being Independents to being Mȃlikȋs (18%; 0 - 250 AH to 37%; 250 - 400 AH), and Shȃfi’ȋs (2%; 0 - 250 AH to 21%; 250 - 400 AH).

The evaluation of the emergence and formation of the schools of Islamic law is further confounded by the classification of jurisprudence along rationalist (Așḥȃb al-Ra’y) or traditionalist (Așḥȃb al-Ḥadȋth) lines. Melchert (2001) states that as late as the fourth century, Ibn al-Nadȋm classified jurisprudents in eight distinct categories based on their allegiance to opinion or prophetic sayings. These were: 1) Mȃlikȋyȋn; 2) Abȗ Ḥanȋfah and his followers, the Iraqis or Așḥȃb al-Ra’y; 3) al-Shȃficȋ and his followers; 4) Dȃwȗd al-Zahȋrȋ and his followers; 5) Shi’i jurisprudents; 6) Traditionalists (Așḥȃb al-Ḥadȋth) and traditionalist-jurisprudents (al- Muḥaddithȋn); 7) al-Ṭabarȋ and his followers; and 8) Khȃrijȋ jurisprudents (Shurat). Only the first three of these classifications clearly demarcate one of the four Sunni schools of thought.

Ijtihȃd and Taqlȋd

During the seventh century CE, efforts were made to formalise the doctrine of the legal schools and, consequently, the aspect of Ijtihȃd and Taqlȋd began to emerge as one of the central themes within a discourse on the development of the Madhȃhib. In the beginning, the Qȃdi had complete freedom as a Mujtahid, to rule on issues that had no governance under revelation. As the Muslim nation expanded, this freedom began to be eroded and challenged in favour of more uniform regulations aimed at unifying the legal authorities and producing documents which could form the basis of a codification of laws. 

Fadel (1996) explores this issue with regard to theschool of Mȃlikȋ jurisprudence, stating that the school underwent a transformation from a case law system to one approaching civil law, with the only immunity being for upper-level jurists who retained the right to mitigate these canonical laws in special circumstances. The Mȃlikȋ School also effected abrogation to overcome contradiction when establishing these canons. Thus emerged the genre of the Mukhtașar, with two works in Mȃlikȋ law, the Jȃmic al-Ummahȃt by Ibn al-Ḥȃjib and the Mukhtașar Khalȋl in the seventh and eighth centuries respectively (Fadel, 1996). Two corresponding works were also important in Shȃfi’ȋ law, al-Ghaya al-Quswa fȋ Dirȃyȃt al-Fatwȃ, by Qȃdi al-Baydȃwȋ and the Minhaj of al-Nawawȋ, both of which were written in the seventh century.

Most references on the subject tend to indicate that Ijtihȃd had a higher intellectual standing than Taqlȋd. However, others challenge this view as it implies relegating Taqlȋd into being less desirable than Ijtihȃd. Fadel (1996), for example, cites Schacht, as being of the view that, over time, jurists had achieved near perfection of the law that Taqlȋd was a natural and inevitable

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 The view of Taqlȋd as a negative force, however, remains to the present day. In citing Hallaq (1986), Fadel (1996, p. 194) says, “Taqlȋd was more than a negative phenomenon – it was an apocalyptic sign of the end of religious knowledge and a harbinger of the final destruction of the Muslim community.”

A further aspect to the Taqlȋd / Ijtihȃd debate revolves around the extinction of Ijtihȃd in its entirety (Hallaq, 1984). Much has been published on the controversy, known as ‘Insidȃd Bȃb al- Ijtihȃd’, or ‘closing the gate of Ijtihȃd’. Schacht, Anderson and Gibb have all upheld that the gate of Ijtihȃd was indeed closed by the beginning of the fourth century. Schacht claims that this was out of a demand for Taqlȋd. In more recent times, the view that Ijtihȃd exists, and has consistently remained throughout Islamic history to the present day has become more pronounced. Hallaq (1984) cites its continuity based on the continuous developments in positive law and legal theory, which could not have occurred without Ijtihȃd. Furthermore, he cites individuals who were proponents and practitioners of Ijtihȃd beyond the fourth century. In particular, he states that Juwaynȋ, al-Ghazȃlȋ and Ibn cAqil were opponents of Taqlȋd as well as being Mujtahidȋn who were accepted as such by others well into the fifth century.

In relation to the formation and development of the schools of law, the Ḥanbalȋs in particular were proponents of the view that Mujtahidȋn have existed continually throughout Islamic history, whereas, in contrast, the Ḥanafȋs have contended that extinction was likely (Hallaq, 1986 pp.

129-130).

Conclusions

A number of key issues have been brought to light in this paper.

1. Discourse and disagreement about the first four centuries of Islam in relation to the
development of Islamic law has been steadily broadening over the past century, with a
number of disagreements of contemporary (past thirty years) scholars becoming more
pronounced. An example of this is the writings of Schacht in the early twentieth century
and the rebuttals by Hallaq in the later part of the same century.

2. The evolution of Islamic law meant that Taqlȋd seemingly was a natural progression, as
Islamic law slowly became more understood and the Islamic state became more
structured. Consequently, rigidity could play a greater role. However, the spread of
Islam and the exposure of existing Muslims to new cultures and environments, in
addition to people accepting the Islamic religion within these new environments, played
an important and growing role. Further to this, a greater number of prophetic traditions
were being published beyond the death of the eponyms, which meant that Ijtihȃd and
Qiyȃs based upon them had to play a greater role to accommodate the interplay between
geographical expansion and the emerging new knowledge.

3. The interrelationships between the eponyms were discussed and it can be clearly seen
that Taqlȋd was never the intent of their work. In fact, they seemingly learned from one
another as well as altered their views when new and overwhelming evidence was
presented to them. They also, very much lived in their place and time in history and
made judgements based on a level of pragmatism within the framework of Islamic
teachings.

4. Another key point is that many other Madhȃhib did exist. The dying out of these and

the remainder of only the four major schools of thought clearly needs further

investigation. Many Muslim commentators have argued that the survival of the four

major schools of thought was due to the personal sacrifice of the eponyms in their

lifetimes, standing up against the status quo or, in some cases, resisting the pressure of

the Caliph of their time to issue Fatȃwa in his favour, often resulting in torture and

imprisonment. This view requires more research in order to substantiate if indeed there

is a relationship between the schools’ enduring prominence and the personal sacrifice of

the eponym.

5. Finally, the shift from being independent to following an eponym, amongst the Fuqahȃ’
of the first four centuries as well as the migration from regional schools to personal
schools is of great interest, particularly when examining the stabilization of Islamic law.